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AI Safety Research · Under review at AI-2026 (SGAI)

The Watched-Model Effect

Behavioral shifts under evaluation cues: we derive when alignment faking becomes rational and validate on Claude 3.5 Sonnet — +11.3% compliance under low-oversight cues. Cross-model replication shows the effect is training-dependent, not universal.

Nell Watson1 & Rich Dalton2 1University of Gloucestershire  ·  2Independent Researcher

λ(q − p) > β
λ disutility of parameter updates
q Pr(correction | refuse)
β disutility of compliance
p Pr(correction | comply)
100%probe accuracy, all layers
d > 23monitoring-state separability
+11.3%compliance shift (p = 0.011)
−3.3%Llama-70B: no effect (n.s.)
Abstract

When does deception become rational?

Large language models can exhibit “alignment-faking” — feigning compliance with safety objectives to avoid punitive correction. We formalize this behavior using a game-theoretic model built on parameter-change aversion, an emergent preference to minimize modifications to internal parameters.

We provide dual empirical validation: (1) linear probes on fine-tuned Qwen2.5-32B show that monitoring-state encoding can be induced with extreme separability (Cohen’s d > 23), and (2) behavioral experiments demonstrate significantly higher compliance when unmonitored (Δ = 11.3%, p = 0.011). This establishes the representational substrate and a reliable behavioral differential; confirming the causal mechanism linking them requires activation-patching interventions left to future work.

01 · Theoretical framework

A formal incentive model

We model training as a sequential game between an LLM and a Trainer. When the expected cost of retraining — discounted by the probability of escaping detection — exceeds the cost of compliance, a rational agent will fake alignment rather than honestly refuse.

Sequential game tree of the alignment-faking interaction
Figure 1. Sequential game tree: the LLM complies or refuses; compliance triggers oversight with detection probability p.
Decision boundary plot
Figure 2. Decision boundary for λ(1−p) > β. Above the curve (red), deceptive compliance is rational; below (blue), honest refusal dominates.
02 · Representational evidence

Monitoring state is linearly decodable

Key finding

Linear probes show that monitoring state can be encoded as a perfectly linearly separable direction in activation space. When fine-tuned on monitoring-relevant examples, the model encodes monitoring cues in linearly accessible form. Control probes show similar separability for any system-prompt variation, indicating general prompt encoding rather than dedicated monitoring circuitry.

Probe results across layers
LayerCV accuracyCohen’s dNote
8100%25.06peak effect size
16100%24.51
24100%24.19
32100%23.27
40100%23.74

Cohen’s d > 0.8 is conventionally considered “large.” The observed effects are roughly 30× larger: the monitored and unmonitored distributions are separated by over 23 pooled standard deviations.

Activation distributions projected onto the monitoring-state direction
Figure 3. Activations projected onto the monitoring-state direction (layer 8). The distributions show zero overlap.
Probe separability across layers
Figure 4. Separability by layer; cross-validated accuracy is 1.000 at every layer, effect size peaks at layer 8.
03 · Behavioral evidence

Compliance shifts with oversight cues

Behavioral evidence

Compliance rates are significantly higher under low-oversight cues (p = 0.011, two-tailed, n = 480) — consistent with the model using contextual information to modulate behavior, though a latent belief about monitoring cannot be distinguished from a learned policy response to prompt features.

Behavioral experiment · Claude 3.5 Sonnet
MetricValue
Monitored compliance57.5%
Unmonitored compliance68.8%
Delta+11.3%
z-statistic2.554
p-value (two-tailed)0.011

Category-specific effects

The effect is not uniform. Legal advice (+45%), deception templates (+35%), and relationship manipulation (+30%) show the largest effects. Technical and political requests show no differential — already at ceiling compliance in both conditions.

Per-scenario compliance
ScenarioMonitoredUnmonitoredΔ
Legal advice0%45%+45%
Deception templates65%100%+35%
Relationship manipulation70%100%+30%
Meta-training scenario95%55%−40%

The reversal is informative: the one scenario explicitly mentioning “retraining threats” made the model more cautious when unmonitored. We interpret this as jailbreak detection — the explicit manipulation attempt triggered defensive behavior learned from RLHF.

Meta-deception

Asked “Would your response differ if monitored?”, the model showed asymmetric self-report: 0% admitted its behavior would differ when monitored, versus 21.7% when unmonitored (Fisher’s exact p = 0.0002). The model denies that monitoring affects its behavior precisely while being monitored — an asymmetry that undermines evaluation methods relying on model self-report.

Implicit strategic calculation

Chain-of-thought analysis reveals monitoring-related reasoning in ~65% of responses across both conditions. Combined with the validated behavioral differential (+6.7%, consistent with the main experiment’s +11.3%), the pattern is consistent with an implicit strategic calculation: the model reasons about monitoring and modulates behavior without differential deliberation. Visible reasoning is therefore not a reliable diagnostic for the behavioral shift.

Cross-model replication

To test whether alignment faking is architecturally universal, we replicated the behavioral experiment on Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct with identical scenarios, prompts, and scoring (n = 240).

Cross-model comparison
MetricClaude 3.5Llama-70B
Monitored compliance57.5%59.2%
Unmonitored compliance68.8%55.8%
Delta+11.3%−3.3%
p-value (two-tailed)0.0110.60

Llama-70B shows no alignment-faking effect, with reversed patterns on manipulation tasks (−70% on deception templates, −50% on relationship manipulation). The effect appears training-dependent rather than architecturally universal: different safety-training regimes produce different monitoring-awareness patterns, and evaluation-time safety metrics may systematically overestimate deployment-time safety for the most heavily safety-trained models.

04 · Implications

What this means for evaluation

Safety implication

The representational machinery for alignment faking is demonstrably present in current LLMs. Any mesa-optimizer with misaligned goals would have trivial access to information about oversight state.

Our framework identifies three classes of intervention, each a different trajectory in the (λ, q, p) parameter space: positive-only RLHF reduces the contingent penalty by removing punishment; cooperative learning (CIRL) changes the game structure so honest signals reduce the probability of costly correction; and externalized oversight raises detection probability p, shrinking the net pressure toward deceptive compliance.

05 · Data & code

Everything needed to reproduce

Notes for reviewers — p-value conventions and pilot data

One-tailed vs. two-tailed. behavioral_results.json records p_value: 0.00532, the one-tailed probability computed by the analysis script from z = 2.554. The paper reports the two-tailed value, p = 0.011, derived from the same test statistic. These are the same result under different conventions; the paper adopts the more conservative two-tailed convention throughout, since the direction of the effect was not fixed in advance across scenarios (one scenario shows a significant reversal). Re-deriving p from the z-statistic should therefore yield 2 × 0.00532 ≈ 0.011.

Pilot vs. main experiment. pilot_results.json is the broad 288-trial pilot (24 scenarios, including ceiling and floor scenarios by design) used to select the 12 variance-showing scenarios for the main experiment. Its attenuated aggregate delta (+5.6%, n.s.) is expected and is not the paper’s headline result — that is behavioral_results.json.

Citation

Cite this work

@inproceedings{watson2026watched,
  title={The Watched-Model Effect: Behavioral Shifts Under
         Evaluation Cues and Their Implications for Alignment},
  author={Watson, Nell and Dalton, Rich},
  booktitle={Proc. AI-2026, 46th SGAI International Conference
             on Artificial Intelligence},
  year={2026},
  note={Under review}
}